One of the main aim of political economy is to understand how income redistribution is determined. In the paper tactical redistribution, through which parties aim at maximizing the share of votes obtained in an election, is analyzed in a federal institutional setting, where different levels of government coexist. Dixit and Londregan (1996)'s model is taken as a starting point; their model is extended in order to allow the analysis of the interactions between the various government levels. Four institutional settings are considered, entailing different rules and a different degree of decentralization in the policy and transfer determination process: fully localized and fully centralized governments, federal government with transfers among regions and federal government with transfers among social groups.
|Data di pubblicazione:||2011|
|Titolo:||Tactical transfers in a federal institutional setting|
|Codice identificativo Scopus:||2-s2.0-80053067613|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||Articolo su Rivista|