A reflection on the role of fear in the criminal sciences implies to focus on a primary emotion with a marked anthropological component. Emotion, in fact, is a complex condition – which arises in response to a certain external stimulus or affectively marked experiences – and is generated by factors that enter into a synergistic relationship: the subjective-experiential component, the physiological component, in turn linked to the psychophysical characteristics of the organism, and the distinctly expressive component. Ekman classifies, for the first time in Western psychology, a limited number of emotions recognized as "primary" or "basic": happiness, fear, anger, surprise, sadness and disgust. For Plutchik, on the other hand, the number of basic emotions would be wider: to the taxonomy elaborated by Ekman adds expectation and acceptance. Beyond adhesion to a specific classification structure, it is important to note that primary emotions are considered such because they are innate, ancestral, found in any population and therefore, ultimately, common to all eras and cultures.
Una riflessione sul ruolo della paura nelle scienze giuridico-penalistiche implica mettere a tema un’emozione primaria a spiccata componente antropologica. L’emozione, infatti, è una condizione complessa – che sorge in risposta a un determinato stimolo esterno o a esperienze affettivamente connotate – ed è generata da fattori che entrano in rapporto sinergico: la componente soggettivo-esperienziale, la componente fisiologica, a sua volta legata alle caratteristiche psicofisiche dell’organismo, e la componente spiccatamente espressiva. Ekman classifica, per la prima volta nella psicologia occidentale, un numero circoscritto di emozioni riconosciute come “primarie” o “di base”: felicità, paura, rabbia, sorpresa, tristezza e disgusto. Per Plutchik, invece, il novero delle emozioni di base sarebbe più ampio: alla tassonomia elaborata da Ekman aggiunge l’attesa e l’accettazione. Al di là dell’adesione a una specifica struttura classificatoria, è importante rilevare come le emozioni primarie siano considerate tali perché innate, ancestrali, riscontrabili in qualsiasi popolazione e perciò, in definitiva, comuni a tutte le epoche e le culture.
Il “ruolo” della paura nel diritto penale e nelle scelte di politica criminale
Grazia Mannozzi
2019-01-01
Abstract
A reflection on the role of fear in the criminal sciences implies to focus on a primary emotion with a marked anthropological component. Emotion, in fact, is a complex condition – which arises in response to a certain external stimulus or affectively marked experiences – and is generated by factors that enter into a synergistic relationship: the subjective-experiential component, the physiological component, in turn linked to the psychophysical characteristics of the organism, and the distinctly expressive component. Ekman classifies, for the first time in Western psychology, a limited number of emotions recognized as "primary" or "basic": happiness, fear, anger, surprise, sadness and disgust. For Plutchik, on the other hand, the number of basic emotions would be wider: to the taxonomy elaborated by Ekman adds expectation and acceptance. Beyond adhesion to a specific classification structure, it is important to note that primary emotions are considered such because they are innate, ancestral, found in any population and therefore, ultimately, common to all eras and cultures.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.